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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI 
HATTIESBURG DIVISION 
 
LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT, in his 
private and individual capacity, on behalf 
of himself and others similarly situated 
RYAN S. WALTERS, 
MICHAEL E. SHOTWELL and 
RICHARD A. CONRAD, ET AL., on behalf 
of themselves and others similarly situated    PLAINTIFFS 
 
 
VS.         NO.2:10-cv-76 
 
 
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official 
capacity as Attorney General of the United 
States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official 
capacity as the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services; 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
THE TREASURY; TIMOTHY F. 
GEITHNER, in his official capacity as the 
Secretary of the United States Department 
of the Treasury; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and HILDA 
L. SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary 
of the United States Department of Labor    DEFENDANTS 
 
 
SECOND AMENDED PETITION 
FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 
 
COME NOW the Petitioners, Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant, in his private and individual 
capacity, Ryan S. Walters, Michael E. Shot well, Richard A. Conrad and others named herein, by 
and through their attorneys, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, and allege 
based on personal knowledge all matters pertaining to themselves and upon information and 
belief as to all other matters, as follows hereinafter. 
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 27    Filed 03/04/11   Page 1 of 46
- 2 - 
 
I. NATURE OF THE AMENDMENT. 
1. 
This Court on February 2, 2011 filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss [13].  The Court held that “the ten primary Plaintiffs have not plead sufficient 
facts to establish that they have standing to challenge the Constitutionality of the minimum 
essential coverage provision of the PPACA,” and further held that “it is generally appropriate to 
permit plaintiffs an opportunity to correct jurisdictional defects in their complaint.”  The Court 
therefore ordered that “if Plaintiffs so desire, they may file a Second Amended Petition within 
thirty (30) days of the entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.”   
2. 
Each and every Petitioner herein earnestly desires an adjudication of their claims, and 
therefore file this, their Second Amended Petition, in conformance with the Court’s Order [26] of 
February 2, 2011.  
A. SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS PERTAINING TO PETITIONERS' 
STANDING TO PURSUE THEIR CHALLENGE TO THE INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATE. 
3. 
Petitioners each specifically allege that they have been currently injured by the passage of 
the PPACA and the Individual Mandate, despite the mandate's future effective date.  The 
Individual Mandate currently is enacted into law, and is a current dictate to perform an act in the 
future, which therefore currently robs Petitioners of the blessings of liberty.  Enforcement of the 
PPACA's Individual Mandate is definitively fixed in time and impending, and Petitioners 
specifically aver that there is a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the 
statute's operation or enforcement that is reasonably pegged to a sufficiently fixed period of time 
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and which is not merely hypothetical or conjectural; that time is the year 2014, when the 
Individual Mandate begins implementation.   
4. 
The American people have a written guarantee known as the Constitution of the United 
States of America that we will live under a government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people.  The Constitution itself states that its purpose is to ensure the blessings of liberty to all 
Americans.  However, despite the guarantees of individual liberty and collective freedom from 
governmental oppression found in the Constitution, Petitioners currently live in oppressive fear 
of the actions that their own elected federal government will take against them when they fail to 
comply with the unjust and immoral mandate that they enter into a contract with a private 
company for the purchase of health insurance.   
5. 
Petitioners each allege that they have no intention whatsoever of complying with the 
Individual Mandate or of purchasing health insurance now or in the future.  Petitioners also each 
allege that there is no possible change of circumstances that might lead them to voluntarily 
comply with the Individual Mandate.  Any such change of circumstances proposed by the 
Defendants would at best be purely speculative and hypothetical.  For Petitioners, the idea that 
the federal government could force them to purchase health insurance is morally and 
ideologically repugnant as well as contrary to their American values of limited government, and 
each individual Petitioner will conscientiously resist the dictate of the PPACA to enter into a 
contract to purchase health insurance.  Moreover, as Petitioners have previously set forth, they 
each desire to maintain their medical privacy, and as set forth herein, the Individual Mandate 
constitutes a serious governmental abrogation of the ancient right to medical privacy. 
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6. 
Petitioners herein each specifically allege that they have already begun to take steps to 
prepare for the implementation of the PPACA, that they are presently having to deviate from 
their previously set plans in response to the PPACA.  Each Petitioner specifically avers that he 
would not purchase health insurance in 2014 but for the requirements of the Act, and each 
further specifically avers that he intends to disobey the PPACA by failing to purchase health 
insurance despite the Individual Mandate.   
7. 
Petitioner specifically aver that there are present detrimental effects upon each Petitioner 
due to the PPACA.  The Individual Mandate begins implementation on January 1, 2014, but 
Petitioners specifically aver that it has already begun to take effect, since it has affected each 
Petitioner in concrete and adverse ways.  Each Petitioner specifically avers that he is currently 
arranging his financial affairs differently than he otherwise would in order to prepare for the 
January 1, 2014 implementation of the Individual Mandate.  Each Petitioner further specifically 
avers that he is making decisions to forego certain spending today, so that he will have the funds 
to pay for the penalties associated with his noncompliance and the associated legal costs of 
defending himself for his noncompliance when the Individual Mandate begins implementation 
on January 1, 2014.  Each Petitioner specifically avers that the impending enforcement of the 
Individual Mandate has forced them to make significant and costly changes in their personal 
financial planning, necessitating significant lifestyle changes and extensive reorganization of 
their personal and financial affairs.  
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8. 
Each Petitioner specifically alleges that the loss of their medical privacy and the 
economic consequences to them of either purchasing insurance or paying for the penalties and 
legal costs of defending themselves for their noncompliance with the Individual Mandate are not 
just possible future injuries, but are certainly impending injuries.  Petitioners each seek to avoid 
the certain consummation of these injuries by obtaining preventive relief through this lawsuit.  
Moreover, each Petitioner further specifically avers the certainly impending implementation of 
the Individual Mandate causes them to currently experience fear, anxiety and emotional distress 
over their loss of medical privacy, their loss of individual freedom of choice, and the economic 
consequences to them of either purchasing insurance or paying for the penalties and legal costs 
of defending themselves for their noncompliance with the Individual Mandate.  Petitioners 
further specifically allege that each of these allegations is capable of proof at the trial that 
Petitioners seek. 
9. 
Petitioners each specifically allege that the law will certainly be enforced on each of 
them.  Each Petitioner specifically alleges that they are “applicable individuals” who must 
comply with the minimum coverage provision.  26 USC § 5000A(d)(1).  Petitioners more 
specifically factually allege that they are not incarcerated individuals, see 26 USC § 
5000A(d)(4), and that they are citizens of the United States, see 26 USC § 5000A(d)(3). 
10. 
Each Petitioner further specifically alleges that they do not meet the requirements for the 
“Religious exemption” definition found in 26 USC § 5000A(d)(2).  Petitioners each allege that 
they are not members of “a recognized religious sect or division thereof described in section 
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1402(g)(1) and an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division as 
described in such section.”  Each Petitioner specifically and explicitly alleges that they are not 
members of a recognized religious sect or division thereof or an adherent of established tenets or 
teachings of such sect or division by reason of which they would be conscientiously opposed to 
acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insurance which makes payments in the event 
of death, disability, old-age, or retirement or that makes payments toward the cost of, or that 
provides services for, medical care (including the benefits of any insurance system established by 
the Social Security Act).  Nor are Petitioners part of any health-sharing ministries 
for individuals sharing “a common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical expenses 
among members in accordance with those beliefs.”  
11. 
Each Petitioner also specifically alleges that their incomes are now and certainly in the 
future will be above the filing threshold.  26 USC § 5000A.  Petitioners further specifically 
allege that are not “Individuals who cannot afford coverage,” as that term is used in 26 USC § 
5000A(e)(1).  Petitioners specifically allege that their required contribution (determined on an 
annual basis) for coverage for any month does not now and will not in the future exceed 8 
percent of such individual’s household income for the taxable year described in section 
1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  Petitioners specifically allege 
that each individual Petitioner’s household income for the taxable year described in section 
1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is not less than 100 percent of 
the poverty line for the size of the family involved (determined in the same manner as under 
subsection (b)(4)); see 26 USC § 5000A(e)(1).   
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12. 
Petitioners specifically allege that they are not members of any Indian tribes as set forth 
under 26 USC § 5000A (e)(4).  Petitioners specifically allege that they have not been determined 
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a 
hardship with respect to the capability to obtain coverage under a qualified health plan.  Each 
Petitioner specifically alleges that he is above the age of eighteen.   
13. 
Petitioner Lt. Governor Phil Bryant specifically pleads that he is an elected official of the 
State of Mississippi, and as such is employed by the State of Mississippi for a term certain, 
which is set to end prior to the date when enforcement of the Individual Mandate begins.  
Whether or not Lt. Governor Bryant remains an elected official or employee of the State of 
Mississippi, however, is a moot point, since he will be subject to the Individual Mandate either 
way.  Petitioner Bryant specifically re-alleges the facts alleged in paragraphs 1-10 supra, and is 
intent on remaining a petitioner in this matter in his individual capacity.    
14. 
Petitioners further state as a cause of action that the religious exemption of the PPACA is 
in itself unconstitutional since it discriminates against different religious faiths by allowing 
followers of one faith who otherwise would be subject to the Individual Mandate to not comply 
with the mandate or be subject to any penalties for such noncompliance, while followers of other 
faiths (like the religious faiths of Petitioners) are subject to the Individual Mandate and to 
penalties for noncompliance.  
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B. SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS PERTAINING TO PETITIONERS' 
STANDING TO PURSUE THEIR CLAIMS REGARDING THE DEPRIVATION 
CAUSED BY THE PPACA OF THIR FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO MEDICAL PRIVACY. 
15. 
The PPACA is an overbearing federal mandate that violates the right of Petitioners to 
choose their own health care.  Moreover, each and every Petitioner has heretofore plead a cause 
of action based upon their constitutional right to medical privacy which has been infringed by the 
PPACA.  Petitioners all specifically allege that they will be required to divulge confidential 
medical information to insurance companies if they enter into a health insurance contract as a 
result of the Individual Mandate.  The Petitioners who do not currently have health insurance 
specifically allege that they do not wish to divulge their confidential medical information to any 
insurance company and would for this reason alone bring this action to contest the 
constitutionality of the PPACA and the Individual Mandate. 
16. 
Petitioner Bryant specifically alleges that he has no intention of ever divulging 
confidential medical information to any insurance company that he is forced to contract with due 
to the PPACA and the Individual Mandate.  Petitioner Bryant specifically alleges that he is being 
coerced by an overbearing federal government to comply with the Individual Mandate, and that 
he is being coerced into divulging confidential medical information to insurance companies.  
Petitioner Bryant and all other Petitioners therefore are specifically contesting the deprivation of 
their fundamental constitutional right to medical privacy. 
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II. PARTIES 
C. PETITIONERS 
 
17. 
 Ryan S. Walters is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Hattiesburg, 
Mississippi within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner 
class in this action. 
18. 
 Michael E. Shot well is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Ellisville, 
Mississippi within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner 
class in this action. 
19. 
 Richard A. Conrad is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel, Mississippi 
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this 
action. 
20. 
 Diane Perdue is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel, Mississippi 
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this 
action. 
21. 
 Elizabeth Sullivan is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel ,Mississippi 
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this 
action. 
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22. 
William M. Carmichael, Jr. is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel, 
Mississippi within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner 
class in this action. 
23.  
Tonya Nobles is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel, Mississippi 
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this 
action. 
24. 
Eddie Nobles is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel, Mississippi 
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this 
action. 
25. 
Mary Kruppe is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Picayune, Mississippi 
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this 
action.  
26. 
Lisa Stewart is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Purvis, Mississippi within 
the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this action.  
27. 
Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Rankin County, 
Mississippi within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner 
class or sub-class in this action. 
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B. DEFENDANTS 
28. 
Eric H. Holder, Jr. is currently the Attorney General of the United States. In his official 
capacity, the Attorney General is the chief federal official responsible for the enforcement of all 
federal statutes in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America.  
29. 
United States Department of Health & Human Services (“HHS”) is an agency of the 
United States and is responsible for administration and enforcement of the PPACA, through its 
center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
30. 
 Kathleen Sebelius is Secretary of HHS and is named as a party in her official capacity. 
31. 
 United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) is an agency of the United States 
and is responsible for administration and enforcement of the PPACA. 
32. 
 Timothy F. Geithner is Secretary of the Treasury and is named as a party in his official 
capacity. 
33. 
 United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) is an agency of the United States and is 
responsible for administration and enforcement of the PPACA. 
34. 
 Hilda L. Solis is Secretary of DOL and is named as a party in her official capacity. 
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III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
35. 
This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the United 
States. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8912; 28U.S.C. § 1331; 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1346.  
36. 
Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) and 28 U.S.C.§ 
1402(a)(1) because Petitioners reside in this district and the events giving rise to these claims 
arose in this district.  
 
IV. NATURE OF ACTION 
37. 
This is an individual action and a statewide class action for declaratory and injunctive 
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 and Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 57 and for review of agency 
action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. It seeks a determination that certain provisions of the 
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” H.R. 3590 (“the PPACA”),as applied to 
Petitioners, violate the United States Constitution by mandating American citizens to purchase 
health insurance, since the government does not have the authority to require citizens to buy any 
good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States. Indeed, a mandate to 
enter into a contract with an insurance company would be the first use of the Commerce Clause 
to universally mandate an activity by all citizens of the United States. If this legal precedent is 
established, Congress would have the unlimited power to regulate, prohibit, or mandate any or 
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all activities in the United States. Such a doctrine would abolish any limit on federal power and 
alter the fundamental relationship of the national government to the states and the people. 
38. 
On March 23, 2010, a new universal healthcare regime, titled the “Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act,” was signed into law by President Barack Obama.  
39. 
The PPACA represents an unprecedented encroachment on the liberty of individuals by 
mandating, inter alia, that all citizens and legal residents of the United States have qualifying 
healthcare coverage or pay a penalty. By imposing such a mandate, the PPACA exceeds the 
powers of the United States Government under Article I of the Constitution and violates the 
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
40. 
In addition, the tax penalty required under the PPACA, which must be paid by uninsured 
citizens and residents, constitutes an unlawful capitation or direct tax, in violation of Article I, 
sections 2 and 9 of the Constitution of the United States. 
41. 
Defendants are seriously intent on enforcing the challenged statutory Individual Mandate 
found and described in Count I of the petition. 
42. 
Petitioners and all others similarly situated are directly subject to the PPACA’s Individual 
Mandate because they do not possess any form of health insurance and are, as such, classified as 
uninsured. Moreover, Petitioners do not desire and have no intention to obey what they consider 
to be an unconstitutional Individual Mandate found and described in Count I of the petition.  
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 27    Filed 03/04/11   Page 13 of 46
- 14 - 
 
43. 
The Individual Mandate’s future effective date, which is definite, does not deprive 
Petitioners of standing or violate the requirement of ripeness since there are threatened injuries to 
Petitioners of having to plan for, invest, save and exhaust the personal resources required as a 
result of incurring the impending expense of purchasing healthcare insurance or, in the 
alternative, to pay a significant monetary penalty for disobeying the PPACA. Since Petitioners 
allege direct economic harm from the PPACA’s impending mandate, standing to assert their 
claims clearly exists. See, e.g., Ok pal obi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir.1999). For the 
purpose of Petitioners’ Constitutional challenge to the PPACA’s certainaly impending Individual 
Mandate, there need be no detailed factual development because the questions presented are 
purely legal. Petitioners simply desire an adjudication of their rights, duties and obligations 
under the PPACA before their injuries are fully and finally consummated. Since Petitioners have 
alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct affected with a constitutional interest, but 
proscribed by the PPACA, and there exists a credible threat of penalty thereunder, they should 
not be required to await and undergo punishment as the sole means of seeking relief. See, e.g., 
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S.289 (1979). The Constitutional violations 
about which Petitioners complain will clearly bare dressed by a favorable decision of the court. 
44.  
The concrete and future threat of injuries and burdens of complying with or being 
punished by the PPACA’s regulatory scheme and Individual Mandate are presently causing 
actual and well-founded worry, fear and anguish on the part of Petitioners.  
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V. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
45. 
It is axiomatic that “our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between 
the states and the federal Government.” See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). The 
Supreme Court recognized and affirmed this fundamental principle from the earliest days of the 
Republic, as Chief Justice Marshall famously observed: “The powers of the legislature are 
defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is 
written.” Mar bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crunch) 137, 176 (1803). 
46.  
Our system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional provisions, and 
not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point explicitly. In fact, the concept 
of state sovereignty is implicit in the Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all 
governmental powers, but only the few, discrete and enumerated ones contained in Article I, 
Section 8.  
47. 
It is an implication rendered express by the Tenth Amendment’s assertion that “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The Tenth Amendment affirms the 
undeniable notion that under our Constitution, the federal government is one of enumerated, 
hence limited, powers. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 (Wheat.) 316, 405(1819) (“This 
government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers”). Stated another way, 
“[t]he powers delegated by the . . . Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. 
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” The 
Federalist No. 45 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).  
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48. 
The structure of the Constitution reflects the federalist values of the document’s framers 
and is inconsistent with any interpretation of the Commerce Clause that would grant Congress 
unlimited power. The Constitution’s framers constrained Congress’s power to specific 
enumerated powers to guard against undue expansion of federal power. Likewise ,the framers 
rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the states and 
instead designed a system in which the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent 
authority over the people, who were, in Alexander Hamilton’s words, “the only proper objects of 
government.”  
49. 
Accordingly, the federal government may act only where the Constitution authorizes it to 
do so. See, e.g., New York v. United States , 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Founder James Madison 
emphasized the importance of limiting the lawmaking powers of the federal government in the 
Federalist Papers: “In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is not to 
be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to 
certain enumerated objects.” The Federalist No. 14, at 97 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1999). 
50.  
By establishing a system of dual sovereignty and limited federal power, the framers 
sought to diffuse the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority in order to protect the people 
from tyranny. As the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed in Gregory, “[t]he Constitutionally 
mandated balance of power’ between the states and the federal government was adopted by the 
framers to ensure the protection of ‘our fundamental liberties.’” 501 U.S.at 458 (quoting 
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Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)); see also Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“federalism secures to citizens the 
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power”). Thus, by dividing power between 
the states and the federal government, our Constitution “reduce[s] the risk of tyranny and abuse 
from either front.” Gregory, 501 U.S.at 458.  
51.  
For this check against tyranny to work, however, there must be a healthy balance of 
power between the states and the federal government. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).  
52. 
The great innovation of the Constitution’s design was that “our citizens would have two 
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.” It has 
been properly described as “a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two 
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.” U.S. Term Limits, Inc. 
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
53. 
Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form of the federal 
government, and the courts have traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form. The 
result may appear “formalistic” in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue, because such 
measures are typically the product of the era’s perceived necessity. But the Constitution “protects 
us from our own best intentions by dividing power among sovereigns and among branches of 
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government precisely so that the majority may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one 
location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.” New York, 505 U.S. at 187. Indeed, 
“[t]his separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of 
liberty.” Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (emphasis added). 
54. 
Congress’s power is not absolute; therefore, authority to enact the Individual Mandate 
must be found in one of its enumerated powers to be constitutionally valid. In the case sub 
judice, Congress has specifically crafted legislation that invokes the Commerce Clause as 
constitutional authority for Congress to impose the PPACA’s mandates. However, adopting the 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause suggested by Congress would forever eliminate 
aforementioned safeguards inherent in the Constitution, thereby making federal power unlimited. 
An ambitious Congress should not be allowed, under the guise of regulating commerce, to 
destroy the federalist structure created by the Constitution’s founders. As Supreme Court Justice 
Anthony Kennedy explained in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, “[w]ere the 
federal government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas 
having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the 
spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become 
illusory.” Lopez, 514 U. S. at 578 (1995). 
55. 
Since NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937), Congress has continued to 
usurp additional powers by pretending the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits. It now 
considers the Commerce Clause the equivalent of a general regulatory power. Until the Court 
replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the 
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original understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers under 
the guise of regulating commerce.  
56. 
The immense power now claimed by Congress and the current administration does not 
comport with either the text or purpose of the Commerce Clause. Specifically, the Constitution 
gives Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 3. It does not give Congress the power 
to regulate commerce and anything and everything having an effect thereon.  
57. 
In its application to domestic affairs, the Commerce Clause was written primarily to 
ensure the free flow of goods and services among the states and to preclude states from 
interfering with that commerce. While Congress’s power to regulate activity under the 
Commerce Clause is without question very broad, it is not unlimited. See, e.g., Wicker v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). When Congress legislates at what are, at best, the outer limits 
of its commerce power, meaningful judicial review of whether that exercise is within Congress’s 
delegated powers is essential if our federal system is to be preserved.  
58. 
The inquiry into the meaning of the Commerce Clause begins with the text. See Reid v. 
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1957) (where language of Constitution is clear, and unambiguous it 
must be given its plain evident meaning). The meaning of the term “commerce” is already 
settled. In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court explained that “commerce” encompasses more 
than simply traffic in commodities; it encompasses “intercourse.” 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 
(1824). In other words, the term applies to the instrumentalities of commerce used to carry 
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commodities from one place to another. The Gibbons definition of commerce is consistent with 
both the views of the founders and of the ordinary meaning of the term “commerce” at the time 
of the Constitution’s drafting. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce 
Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1389 (1987).  
59. 
Importantly, the Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations and with Indian tribes. Any activity that affects commerce of one 
category in some attenuated way would necessarily affect the other two categories. This result 
renders the separately enumerated categories redundant. The broad and expansive interpretation 
urged by the United States Government, therefore, contradicts the principle that “The Commerce 
Clause draws a clear distinction between ‘States’ and ‘Indian tribes.”’ See Cotton Petroleum 
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191-92 (1989); see Epstein, supra, at 1393-94. 
Significantly, every activity affects commerce in some insignificant way. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 
1362. Had the Founders intended the commerce power to be unlimited, enumerating three 
categories of commerce for Congress to regulate would have been wholly unnecessary. See 
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95.  
60. 
For Congress to regulate activity under the Commerce Clause, the activity itself must be 
commercial. As Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in Lopez, “the power to regulate 
‘commerce’ can by no means encompass authority over mere gun possession, anymore than it 
empowers the federal government to regulate marriage, littering, or cruelty to animals, 
throughout the 50 states. Our Constitution quite properly leaves such matters to the individual 
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states, notwithstanding these activities’ effects on interstate commerce.” Lopez,514 U.S. at 585 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  
61. 
To empower the PPACA pursuant to Congress’s broad interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause would render other constitutional provisions completely meaningless. Extending the 
Commerce Clause to reach any matter that affects commerce renders thee numerated powers 
nugatory. Indeed, the enumerated powers are all superfluous and without real effect if the 
commerce power extends to any matter that has any effect upon commerce. Such an 
interpretation would violate the traditional rule that the Constitution should not be interpreted to 
render other portions of the Constitution meaningless. E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).  
62. 
While an offense may be created and “punished by Congress, under its general authority 
to make all laws necessary and proper to execute their delegated constitutional powers,” United 
States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838), Congress may criminalize or make unlawful 
certain activity (not inactivity) under the necessary and proper clause only when it is pursuing an 
end which is clearly within its enumerated powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316, 423 (1819); see also Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 75. In other words, Congress may 
regulate a local activity only if its purpose comports with its delegated power to regulate 
commerce and the regulation is plainly adapted to its interstate commerce purpose.  
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63. 
The Supreme Court has also made clear that Congress cannot exercise authority not 
granted to it under the pretext of exercising its enumerated powers. See McCulloch, 17 U.S.(4 
Wheat.) at 423.  
64. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the mere fact that Congress has said when a 
particular activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by 
this Court.” Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964); see also Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981)(Rehnquist, J., concurring).  
65. 
As such, the Court should not assume that facts exist to support Congressional action in 
regards to the PPACA. While courts properly assume a state of facts when assessing the 
rationality of legislative means, see FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (1993),this is 
because the necessary and proper clause grants Congress broad discretion to enact “all means 
which are appropriate, [and] which are plainly adapted to” a legitimate end. See McCulloch, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. But it does not extend to the question of the validity of the end itself. The 
extreme and unwarranted deference on the question of legislative end surged by Congress is 
antithetical to a constitutional system which “created a federal Government of limited powers.” 
See Gregory, 501 U.S. 452 at 457.  
66. 
Though some deference is certainly due Congress, if that were tantamount to treating 
Congress as the sole judge of the limits on its constitutional authority, no judicial review would 
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be needed or even possible, and the principle of enumerated powers would amount to an empty 
promise. The doctrine of deference has not yet rendered judicial review superfluous.  
 
 
67. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, Congress’s power to declare activity unlawful under the 
Commerce Clause is limited by the scope of that power. Although the Supreme Court has 
sanctioned a broad use of the commerce power, its decisions nonetheless make clear that the 
Commerce Clause has real and substantial limits. Were it otherwise, it would be meaningless to 
speak of a “federal government of limited powers.” See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457.  
68. 
The “substantial economic effect” Commerce Clause cases since Jones & Laughlin Steel 
consistently refer to “activities.” See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37(“intrastate 
activities, by reason of close and intimate relation to interstate commerce, may fall within federal 
control”); Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 (“those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them 
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end”); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 
315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (“intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or 
obstruct the exercise of the granted power”); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (“even if apple’s activity 
be local, and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be 
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”); Perez, 
402 U.S. at 150 (“activities affecting commerce”); Lopez, 514U.S. at 558 (“three broad 
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power”); Morrison, 529 
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U.S. at 698 (“three broad categories of activity”) (quoting Lopez); Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 
(“activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”). Consequently, in order to render 
conduct unlawful under the Commerce Clause, Congress must be regulating interstate 
commerce, not merely inactivity. Congress cannot, under the guise of regulating interstate 
commerce, legislate beyond its delegated authority. And Congress’s regulation of intrastate 
activity must reach activity that has a real and “substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce.” See Perez, 402 U.S. at 152 (quoting Wickard, 317U.S. at 125). The Individual 
Mandate to purchase insurance, discussed infra, goes well beyond the bounds of the Commerce 
Clause.  
VI. COUNT ONE 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
69. 
Petitioners realize, adopt, and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs as though 
fully set forth herein. 
70. 
Most American citizens, including Petitioners, will be required to be insured or, in the 
alternative, pay a fine. The mandate takes effect on January 1, 2014. This “personal 
responsibility” provision of the legislation is more accurately known as the “Individual Mandate” 
because it commands all individuals to enter into a contractual relationship with a private 
insurance company. Surprisingly, an Individual Mandate to buy health insurance has been a 
component of most health care reform plans proposed over the years. Based on the premise that 
if everyone had health insurance, it is argued that health care costs would be spread equally 
among everyone, and the individual cost for health insurance would be reduced. 
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71. 
Some in Congress have contended that the Individual Mandate rationale is similar to the 
policy justification for requiring all drivers to maintain automobile liability insurance as a pre-
requisite to maintaining a drivers’ license. But such an analogy is tenuous and stretches the 
bounds of common sense, at best. The purpose of state auto insurance mandates is to provide 
financial protection for others that an insured driver may harm, and not necessarily for the driver 
himself. Moreover, an auto insurance mandate is a conditional exchange for having a state issue 
the privilege of a driver’s license. Simply put, a person is not mandated to have a driver’s license 
or automobile insurance unless he wishes to drive his automobile on public roads. Even more 
importantly from a Constitutional standpoint, state requirements differ from federal requirements 
since Congress does not possess a general police power, unlike the states. 
72. 
Under the PPACA, those without qualifying health insurance coverage will be subject to 
an Individual Mandate requiring the purchase of coverage from a private insurance company. If 
the mandate is not followed, then those without qualifying health insurance will be subject to 
what the PPACA expressly describes as a “penalty.” The penalty will be phased in according to 
the following schedule: $95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, and $695 in 2016 for the flat fee or 1.0% of 
taxable income in 2014, 2.0% of taxable income in 2015, and 2.5% of taxable income in 2016. 
Beginning in 2016, the penalty will be increased annually by a cost-of-living adjustment, making 
it more progressive. 
73. 
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) acknowledged the unprecedented nature of an 
Individual Mandate when assessing the Clinton health care reform proposal of 1993: “A mandate 
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requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance would be an unprecedented form of federal 
action. The government has never required people to buy any good or service as a condition of 
lawful residence in the United States. An Individual Mandate has two features that, in 
combination, make it unique. First, it would impose a duty on individuals as members of society. 
Second, it would require people to purchase a specific service that would have to be heavily 
regulated by the federal government.” The CBO likewise observed that the only analogous 
mandate on individual behavior from the federal government on this level would be the 
registration provisions under the Selective Service Act. The authority to impose a selective 
service system and military draft, however, is founded under the Congressional Article I power 
to raise and support armies, not under the Commerce Clause utilized by Congress this case. See 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/ 
doc38.pdf.  
 
 74. 
The Congressional Research Service (“CRS”), an entity that traditionally expresses the 
most permissive view of Congressional Article I powers, when asked by the Senate Finance 
Committee to opine on whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose an Individual 
Mandate of this nature, expressed an uncertain position, noting that “whether such a requirement 
would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause is perhaps the most challenging question 
posed by such a proposal, as it is a novel issue whether Congress may use this clause to require 
an individual to purchase a good or a service.” Stamen & Brougher, Requiring, Individuals to 
Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis (2009) http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/ 
R40725_20090724.pdf (discussed infra).  
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75. 
The purpose of Congress’s compulsory Individual Mandate, coupled with arbitrary price 
ratios and controls, is to require persons to buy artificially high-priced policies to subsidize 
coverage for others as well as an industry overly burdened with other government costs and 
regulations. Revenues paid by conscripted citizens to the insurance companies are needed to 
compensate for the increased costs imposed upon these companies and the healthcare industry by 
the myriad regulations of the PPACA.  
76. 
An Individual Mandate to enter into a contract with or buy a particular product from a 
private party, with penalties to enforce it, is unprecedented not just in scope but in kind. It is also 
unconstitutional as a matter of first principles and under any reasonable reading of judicial 
precedents.  
77. 
Nowhere in the Constitution is Congress given the power to mandate that an individual 
enter into a contract with a private party or purchase a good or service. There is simply no 
legislative or judicial precedent for this claim of congressional power. Because this claim of 
power by Congress would literally be without precedent, it could only be upheld if the Supreme 
Court is willing to create a new constitutional doctrine.  
78. 
In the last seventy years, the Supreme Court has applied a relatively straightforward 
judicial test to determine whether a federal statute is within the commerce power of Congress. 
When evaluating a claim of power under the Commerce Clause, the Court proceeds with a two-
pronged inquiry. First, the Court determines whether the entire class of regulated activity is 
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within Congress’s constitutional reach; and second, whether the petitioner is a member of that 
class.  
79. 
A long line of Supreme Court cases establishes that Congress may regulate three 
categories of activity pursuant to the commerce power. These categories were first summarized 
in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), and most recently reaffirmed in Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). First, Congress may regulate the “channels of interstate or foreign 
commerce” such as the regulation of steamship, railroad, highway, or aircraft transportation or 
prevent them from being misused, as, for example, the shipment of stolen goods or of persons 
who have been kidnapped. Second, the commerce power extends to protecting “the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” as, for example, the destruction of an aircraft, or 
persons or things in commerce, as, for example, thefts from interstate shipments.” Third, 
Congress may regulate economic activities that “substantially affect interstate commerce.”  
80. 
Under the first prong of its Commerce Clause analysis, the Supreme Court asks whether 
the class of activities regulated by the statute falls within one or more of these categories. Since 
an individual health insurance mandate is not even arguably a regulation of a channel or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, it must either fit in the third category or none at all. 
Predictably, Congress has cited only this third basis as Constitutional authority for the PPACA. 
The new law asserts that: “[t]he individual responsibility requirement . . . is commercial and 
economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce. . . . The requirement regulates 
activity that is commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how 
and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.”  
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81. 
Contrary to the federal government’s intent, the third category was not meant to afford 
Congress a pretextual excuse to regulate any activity that had any effect on commerce, however 
trivial.  
82. 
Significantly, the mandate imposed by the pending bills does not regulate or prohibit the 
economic activity of providing or administering health insurance. Nor does it regulate or prohibit 
the economic activity of providing health care, whether by doctors, hospitals, pharmaceutical 
companies, or other entities engaged in the business of providing a medical good or service. The 
health care mandate does not purport to regulate or prohibit activity of any kind, whether 
economic or noneconomic. To the contrary, it simply purports to “regulate” inactivity. 
Regulating commerce, however, is distinctly different from requiring persons to engage in it.  
83. 
By its own plain terms, the Individual Mandate provision regulates the absence of action. 
To uphold this power under its existing doctrine, the Court must conclude that an individual’s 
failure to enter into a contract for health insurance is an activity that is “economic” in nature – 
that is, part of a “class of activity” that “substantially affects interstate commerce.”  
84. 
Never in this nation’s history has the commerce power been used to require a person to 
affirmatively engage in economic activity. No decision of the Supreme Court has ever upheld 
such a claim of power. Such a regulation of a “class of inactivity” is of a wholly different kind 
than any at issue in the Court’s most expansive interpretations of the Commerce Clause. 
Previous cases have all involved negative prohibitions on private conduct. The affirmative 
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Individual Mandate contained in the PPACA is substantially different from a negative 
prohibition.  
85. 
A mandate to enter into a contract with an insurance company would be the first use of 
the Commerce Clause to universally mandate an activity by all citizens of the United States. If 
such a precedent is established, Congress would have the unlimited power to regulate, prohibit, 
or mandate any or all activities in the United States. Such a doctrine would abolish any limit on 
federal power and alter the fundamental relationship of then national government to the states 
and the people.  
86. 
By boldly asserting that the authority to regulate interstate commerce includes the power 
to regulate not merely voluntary activity that is commercial or even ancillary thereto but 
inactivity that is expressly designed to avoid entry into the relevant market, the federal 
government advocates a Constitutional doctrine that effectively removes any boundaries to 
Congress’s commerce power.  
87.  
Even in wartime, when the production of material is crucial to national survival, 
Congress has never claimed such a power. For example, during World War II, no farmer was 
forced to grow food for the troops; no worker was forced to build tanks. While the federal 
government encouraged the public to buy its bonds to finance the war effort, it never mandated 
they do so. While Congress levied a military draft, it did so as necessary and proper to its 
enumerated power in Article I, sec. 8 “to raise and support armies,” not its commerce power. 
What Congress did not and cannot do during a wartime emergency, with national survival at 
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stake, it cannot do in peacetime simply to avoid the political cost of raising taxes to pay for new 
government programs. 
88. 
While Congress has used its taxing power to fund Social Security and Medicare, never 
before has it used its commerce power to mandate that an individual person engage in an 
economic transaction with a private company. Using commerce power to regulate the auto 
industry is one thing; making everyone purchase an automobile is quite another. 
89. 
Although it has been argued that Congress has the power to enforce this mandate because 
the Constitution empowers the federal government to tax citizens, the particular tax at issue in 
this matter is acknowledged in the very text of the legislation to be a “penalty “meant to punish 
citizens for their refusal to purchase health insurance from a private company. Properly defined, 
a penalty is “[a]n elastic term with many different shades of meaning; it involves [the] idea of 
punishment, corporeal or pecuniary, or civil or criminal, although its meaning is generally 
confined to pecuniary punishment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1133 (6th ed. 1990). Central to the 
definition of penalty is the “idea of punishment” – “punishment imposed on a wrongdoer . . . in 
the form of imprisonment or fine. Though usually for crimes, penalties are also sometimes 
imposed for civil wrongs.”Black’s Law Dictionary 1153 (7th ed. 1999). Congress lacks the 
power under the Commerce Clause to punish citizens for their refusal to engage in the activity of 
purchasing health insurance. Such punishment, meted out by our elected leaders, is an assault 
upon the values enshrined in our Constitution.  
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90. 
Whether Congress describes the payment mechanism contained in the Individual 
Mandate a tax or a fine, it cannot so simply circumvent Constitutional proscriptions on its power. 
Otherwise, it could evade all Constitutional limits on its authority by merely imposing the 
utilization of “taxes” whenever any individual or entity fails to follow a prescribed course of 
action. In fact, the Supreme Court has already rejected a similar approach. In Child Labor Tax 
Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), 259 U.S. 20 (1922),the Court specifically ruled that 
Congress could not impose a “tax” in order to penalize conduct – the utilization of child labor – 
that it could not regulate under the Commerce Clause. In so doing, the Court recognized, all that 
Congress would need to do, hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control any one of the great 
number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the states have never parted with, and 
which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure of 
complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures from it. To 
give such magic to the word ‘tax’ would be to break down all constitutional limitation of the 
powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the states.” Drexel, 259 U.S. at 
38(emphasis added). 
91. 
To uphold the constitutionality of a health care Individual Mandate, the Court would have 
to find that a decision not to enter into a contract to purchase a good or service was an economic 
activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. By this reasoning, every 
action or inaction could be characterized as “economic,” thereby destroying any limitation on the 
commerce power of Congress.  
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92.  
Because the personal insurance mandate purports to reach the refusal to engage in 
economic activity – which is both inactivity and noneconomic – the Court cannot uphold such an 
exercise of power without admitting that the Commerce Clause has no limits, a proposition it 
rejected in Lopez and Morrison, and from which the Supreme Court did not retreat in Raich. See 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
93. 
Although Congress may arguably regulate select aspects of the health care industry or the 
health insurance industry in light of their substantial effect on interstate commerce, the PPACA’s 
Individual Mandate regulates the noneconomic inactivity of not purchasing a particular service 
or entering into a contract. Individuals’ decisions not to enter certain economic transactions have 
never before subjected them to the federal regulation of a market that they have chosen not to 
enter. The PPACA’s Individual Mandate provision would have the effect of subjecting an 
individual’s decisions to federal control by virtue of the fact that the person merely resides 
within the borders of the United States.  
94. 
Not only does the Commerce Clause fail to provide Congress with the authority to 
impose the Individual Mandate, the compelled purchase of health insurance also constitutes the 
“taking” of private property under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Requiring Petitioners to devote a penalty or a percent of their personal income for a purpose 
which they otherwise would not voluntarily choose based on individual circumstances is an 
arbitrary and capricious “taking” of property.  
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95.  
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as granting substantive due process rights to American citizens. In this regard, the 
Supreme Court has concluded that due process protects against the transgression of personal 
immunities that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325 (1937); see Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 191(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 950 (1980). Without question, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty is the right of a 
person to be free from purchasing a good or service the individual does not desire to purchase. 
96. 
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court defined those “liberty” 
interests protected by the due process clause as follows: “While this court has not attempted to 
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration, and 
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely 
freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of 
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally 
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common-law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
97. 
Such liberty interests implicit within the substantive parameters of the due process clause 
include the right of an extended family to share a household, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494 (1977); the right of a woman to decide whether to have an abortion, Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973); the freedom to marry a person of another race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
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1 (1967); the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,383 U.S. 663 (1966); the 
right to use contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479(1965); the right of access to 
the courts, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 
357 U.S. 449 (1958); the right to send children to private schools, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925); and the right to have children instructed in foreign language, Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
98.. 
For the purposes of a substantive due process analysis there is no meaningful distinction 
between a person who asserts the right to contract or associate with another private entity and a 
person who asserts the right not to enter a contract or to associate with another private entity. 
Refusal to enter into a contract in the face of an illegitimate demand for a contract is subject to 
protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Just as 
a person has a First Amendment Constitutional right, in certain circumstances, to be free from 
exercising freedom of speech. Petitioners in this matter have the Constitutional right to be free 
from entering a private contractor an involuntary association.  
 
99. 
Moreover, compelling Petitioners to enter into a private contract to purchase insurance 
from another entity will legally require them to share private and personal information with the 
contracting party. Specifically, by requiring Petitioners to abide by the PPACA’s Individual 
Mandate, Congress is also compelling Petitioners to fully disclose past medical conditions, habits 
and behaviors. Not only will the insurer be privy to all past medical information, Congress’s 
Individual Mandate will, by necessity, allow the compelled insurer access to Petitioners’ present 
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and future medical information of a confidential nature. If judicially enforceable privacy rights 
mean anything, then private and confidential medical details certainly merit Constitutional 
protection. Petitioners should not be forced to disclose the most intimate details of their past, 
present and future medical information.  
100. 
The PPACA’s Individual Mandate expressly violates Petitioners fundamental rights they 
enjoy as part of the “liberty” interest under the Fifth Amendment. Fundamental rights such as 
“the right to make one’s own health care decisions,” “the right to abstain from entering into a 
contractual relationship with another private entity” and “the right to not be compelled to divulge 
private medical information to another private entity” are deeply rooted in American history and 
tradition and implicated by the imposition of the PPACA. The new law’s Individual Mandate 
represents an abuse of Congressional authority and a clear violation of substantive due process 
protections, since Petitioners benefit from a constitutionally protected interest in making certain 
kinds of important decisions free from governmental compulsion. The right to privacy judicially 
developed pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments can be understood only by 
considering both the Petitioners’ collective interest and the nature of the federal government’s 
interference with it. In short, a judicially recognized right to privacy protects Petitioners from 
unduly burdensome interference with their freedom to decide whether to voluntarily purchase 
health insurance.  
101. 
Federalization of “inactivity” imposes a significant threat to the states’ sovereign choices 
and individual liberty. Many states have exercised their “sovereign right to adopt in[their] own 
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Constitution[s] individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the federal 
Constitution.” See Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).  
102. 
The Court should not devise any new doctrines by which to uphold an individual health 
insurance mandate. First and foremost, as already mentioned, to uphold this exercise of power, 
the Court would have to affirm for the first time in its history that Congress has a general or 
plenary police power, a position expressly rejected by the Constitution and a finding the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to take.  
 
VII. COUNT TWO 
VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION  
OF UNAPPORTIONED CAPITATION OR DIRECT TAX 
103. 
Petitioners realize, adopt, and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs as though 
fully set forth herein. 
104. 
The tax penalty on uninsured persons under the PPACA constitutes a capitation and a 
direct tax that is not apportioned among the states according to census data, thereby injuring the 
sovereign interests of Petitioners. 
105. 
Said penalty tax applies without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance 
and is unrelated to any taxable event or activity. It is to be levied upon persons for their failure or 
refusal to do anything other than to exist and reside within the United States. Because the penalty 
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tax is not predicated on any actual event, thing, or action, the Individual Mandate represents a 
capitation tax that is not properly apportioned per Article I section 9 clause 4. 
106. 
By its imposition of the penalty tax, the PPACA injures the State of Mississippi’s interest 
as a sovereign vested with exclusive authority, except to the extent permitted to the federal 
government by the Constitution, to make all taxing decisions affecting its citizens and to confer a 
right upon persons in the State to make health care decisions without government interference. 
The tax penalty is unconstitutional on its face and cannot be applied constitutionally.  
 
VIII. COUNT THREE 
VIOLATION OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP AND 
LOSS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE DISCRETION 
(Lt107. Gov107. Phil Bryant, in his Individual Capacity) 
108. 
Petitioners realize, adopt, and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs as though 
fully set forth herein. 
109. 
The State of Mississippi is an employer subject to provisions of the PPACA mandating 
that the State provide a health insurance plan to its employees that conforms to the rules provided 
in the PPACA and the regulations promulgated there under. Prior to enactment of the PPACA, 
the State of Mississippi, as an employer, was free to choose the health insurance plans it offered 
to its employees, and employees were free to choose from one or more plans offered by the State 
of Mississippi, or to purchase a health insurance plan on the private market that does not 
conform to the new federal regulations, or even to not be covered by any health insurance plan at 
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all. Pursuant to the PPACA, Congress has chosen to unconstitutionally regulate exactly what 
healthcare plans employers like the State of Mississippi must offer and what healthcare plans that 
its employees must accept.  
110. 
Employees of the State of Mississippi will be forced by Congress to purchase health 
insurance either from their employer or in the private market, with similar penalties for 
noncompliance as discussed supra. Consequently, State employees are directly affected and 
commandeered by the PPACA, since the law necessarily substitutes the judgment of Congress 
and the Executive branches of the federal government for that of the employees and their 
employer, which is a State government, regarding the composition of health insurance plans that 
may be offered to and accepted or rejected by employees. 
111. 
State employees will clearly suffer a deprivation of liberty, in that they may no longer 
exercise the discretion to choose a healthcare plan that does not conform to the PPACA’s 
mandates either from their employer or on the open market. Congress has therefore chosen to 
regulate personal decisions in a way that deprives employees of a liberty interest and that 
exceeds Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Such an approach amounts to an 
unconstitutional commandeering of State government. 
112. 
The PPACA will convert what previously had been a voluntary federal-state partnership 
into a compulsory top-down federal program in which the discretion of the Petitioner Bryant, the 
State of Mississippi and its government employees is removed, in derogation of the core 
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constitutional principle of federalism upon which the Republic was founded. In so doing, the 
PPACA exceeds the powers of Congress and violates the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
113. 
Petitioner Bryant, as Mississippi’s Lieutenant Governor, is an employee of the State of 
Mississippi who brings this cause of action in his individual capacity as a private citizen and an 
employee rather than as an elected official of the State of Mississippi. As government employee, 
Petitioner Bryant is directly injured by the PPACA’s mandate that the State of Mississippi offer 
health insurance plans to its employees that conform solely to the judgment of the federal 
government of the United States, heedless of the desires of the employer or employees. He is 
further injured by the enactment of the Individual Mandate, because he now cannot choose to 
drop the federally mandated plan that his employer must offer in favor of non-insurance without 
incurring penalties imposed by Congress. 
IX. CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
114. 
First, Petitioners bring this action as individuals and as a statewide class action pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Petitioners’ petition, which alleges class-wide unconstitutional activity is 
particularly well suited for 23(b)(2) treatment since the common claim is susceptible to a single 
proof and subject to a single injunctive. Petitioners qualify for an Injunctive and Declaratory 
Class Under Rule 23(b)(2)on behalf of a class defined as follows: 
(a) All persons in Mississippi who fall within the purview of the PPACA and who 
therefore will be required, as part of the law’s Individual Mandate, to purchase health insurance; 
(b) All persons in Mississippi who will be prosecuted or otherwise penalized frothier 
inactivity and/or refusal enter into a contract for the purchase of health insurance as mandated by 
the PPACA; 
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(c)  The class excludes all persons who, at the time this Complaint is filed, do not fall 
under the purview of the PPACA or who have already instituted individual litigation in 
Mississippi seeking similar relief against Defendants on the basis of the circumstances described 
in the above-referenced paragraphs. 
Second, Petitioners seek to establish a class or sub-class encompassing governmental 
employees of the State of Mississippi. Specifically, Petitioner Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant, in his 
individual capacity, brings an individual action and a statewide class or sub-class action pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. His claims allege class-wide unconstitutional activity on behalf of all 
Mississippi state employees and is particularly well suited for 23(b)(2) treatment since the 
common claim is susceptible to a single proof and subject to a single injunctive. Petitioner 
Bryant’s class or sub-class would represent a request for Injunctive and Declaratory relief on 
behalf of a class or sub-class defined as follows: 
(a)  All government employees of the State of Mississippi who fall within the purview 
of the PPACA and who currently possess healthcare insurance as part of their employment with 
the State. 
(b)  All government employees of the State of Mississippi who will be adversely 
affected by the PPACA’s implementation.  
 (c)  This class or sub-class excludes all persons who, at the time this Complaint 
misfiled, do not fall under the purview of the PPACA or who have already instituted individual 
litigation in Mississippi seeking similar relief against Defendants on the basis of the 
circumstances described in the above-referenced paragraphs. 
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115. 
Those persons excluded from the class by subparagraphs (c) of paragraph 97, supra may 
opt into the class at any time, but not later than ten (10) days prior to the final hearing regarding 
injunctive issues against Defendants. Exercise of this opt-in right will require some affirmative 
act by the person or an attorney of the person, such as by filling out and mailing an opt-in notice 
listing by name all persons who wish to opt into the class. All persons who are excluded from the 
class by subparagraphs (c) or paragraph 97, supra, who do not affirmatively opt into the class by 
the specified date will not be bound by the class. 
116. 
Petitioners are members of the class they seek to represent. Moreover, Petitioners’ 
interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the other class members. Petitioners’ 
claims are typical of the claims of the other class members, and Petitioners will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.  
117. 
Specifically, and without limitation, the following questions of law and fact are common 
to all class members: whether Defendants have the Constitutional authority to mandate class 
members to purchase health insurance and incur health insurance premiums, or in the alternative, 
to subject class members to a monetary penalty. As to Petitioner Bryant’s class or sub class, 
without limitation, the following questions of law and fact are common to all class or sub-class 
members: whether Defendants have the Constitutional authority to substitute the judgment of 
Congress and the Executive branches of the federal government for that of another government’s 
employees and their employer, which is a State government, regarding the composition of health 
insurance plans that may be offered to and voluntarily accepted or rejected by employees. 
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118. 
The claims of the representative Petitioners named herein are typical of the claims of the 
class. 
119. 
The Petitioner class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 
120. 
Prosecution of separate actions by individual class members will create the risk of 
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members which would 
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants and would also, as a practical 
matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications, or which 
would substantially impair or impede such members’ abilities to protect their interests. 
121. 
Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making 
appropriate relief with respect to the class as a whole. 
122. 
The questions of law and fact common to the class members predominate over questions 
affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for 
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 
123. 
Rule 23(b)(2) actions are not “opt-out” classes and notice is not mandatory in such cases. 
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X. COUNT FOUR 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
124. 
Petitioners realize, adopt, and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs as though 
fully set forth herein.  There is an actual controversy of sufficient immediacy and concreteness 
relating to the legal rights and duties of the Petitioners and their legal relations with the 
Defendants to warrant relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201. 
125. 
The harm to the Petitioners as a direct result of the PPACA is sufficiently real and 
imminent to warrant the issuance of a conclusive declaratory judgment clarifying the legal 
relations of the parties. 
XI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
126. 
As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Petitioners, including the 
Petitioner class, are entitled to the following relief: 
(a) Injunctive relief as this Court deems appropriate to declare unconstitutional and 
therefore eliminate the PPACA’s Individual Mandate that persons enter into a private contract to 
purchase healthcare insurance; 
(b)  A declaration of Petitioners’ rights, duties and obligations under the PPACA; 
specifically, as to whether Petitioners must purchase healthcare insurance or be required by the 
federal government to pay a monetary or criminal penalty; 
(c) Reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to Petitioners pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2412 or 
any other applicable statutory provision;  
 (d) Such other and further relief as this court deems appropriate; and 
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 (e)  Interest and costs of this action, including costs of notice to class members, if 
required, and all related expenses of processing class members’ claims. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully request this Court to grant the relief requested in 
the preceding paragraphs. 
Respectfully submitted on Friday, March 04, 2011. 
LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT, RYAN S. WALTERS, 
MICHAEL E.SHOTWELL AND RICHARD A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document has been served using the 
Court’s ECF system, on Friday, March 04, 2011 to the counsel of record for all Defendants 
 
 Dated Friday, March 04, 2011. 
By: /s/ Christopher B. McDaniel  
CHRISTOPHER B. McDANIEL 
 
By: /s/ K. Douglas Lee  
       K. DOUGLAS LEE  
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